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rehabilitated along the lines of John Grodzinski’s Defender of Canada
(2013) despite his shortcomings as an operational commander; and
Commodore James Yeo, the commander of British naval forces, is
treated as an impediment to operations, yet he did make significant
contributions as ably described in Robert Malcomson’s Lords of the
Lake (1998).
Despite these criticisms, And A ll Their Glory Past is a fine
concluding volume to this trilogy and covers the closing period of the
War of 1812 in an entertaining and lucid fashion. Its breadth and
scope make it useful to both historians and students alike.
RICH ROY, PHD, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

Caen Controversy: The Battle for Sword Beach IQ44. Andrew
Stewart. Solihul: Helion & Company, 2014. Pp. 164.
Caen Controversy is a narrative account of the activities and
performance of the 3 (British) Infantry Division that fought in
the Sword sector on the eastern flank of the D-Day landings in
Normandy. In order to contextualise the Division’s progress inland
the book also describes the preparations for the landings, the
supporting activities of the 6 Airborne Division, which protected
the left flank of the Allied forces, and it assesses the capabilities
and challenges facing the German defenders. The book’s aim is to
analyse the performance of the assaulting officers and soldiers, in
the context of the objectives set for them, to examine their relative
success. Stewart’s narrative closes on the evening of 6 June 1944
when, although a solid lodgement had been secured away from the
beaches, the objective of Caen had not been taken.
The controversy described in the book stems from an enduring
perception that 3 Br Inf Div was excessively cautious in advancing
towards Caen and was affected by an offensive malaise which
permeated staff and soldiers alike. The French, of course, might
consider any controversy relating to Caen in terms of the deaths
of over a thousand French civilians killed by the Allied Air Forces
bombing of the city in June and July 1944, something that still
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rankles with the city’s residents today.1*But unlike John Buckley’s
Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe,
Stewart’s version of the Caen Controversy is not a radical revisionist
reappraisal of the fighting performance of the British troops. Instead,
it challenges the argument that the failure to take Caen was the result
of a general lack of ‘offensive eagerness’. Stewart’s analysis adds to
the understanding of what happened on and beyond Sword beach on
6 June 1944 by explaining how a combination of factors and events
conspired to expose 185 Brigade to what seemed to be considerable
risk. In doing so it explains why the Brigade’s commander, Brigadier
K. P. Smith, decided not to ‘bash on regardless’ and, instead, to
methodically take a German strongpoint named ‘Hillman’, the last
major barrier between the beaches and Caen and by the threat posed
by reports of German panzers nearby.
What makes this book especially interesting is its detailed
analysis of a multiplicity of factors that delayed the move inland and
affected the capabilities of the assaulting British forces. In particular,
the book describes how the loss of so many officers to sniper fire
induced a general loss of confidence and offensive spirit amongst
many of the surviving troops; how the plan was vulnerable to the loss
of the forward observer responsible for bringing down naval gunfire
on Hillman; why it was necessary to reconfigure the assault with
artillery and tank fire support; the impact of beach bottlenecks and
poor communications which, amongst other things, caused Smith
to think the Germans still held St Aubin; and, finally, the threat
of German armour between Hillman and Caen. The combination
and response to these influences meant that it took seven and a
half hours to secure ‘Hillman’, which meant that Caen could not be
reached by nightfall. Stewart’s main focus: the analysis of the factors
affecting the troops on the ground is very well explained and many of
conclusions are derived by drawing on primary source material from
regimental archives, supported to contextualise events by a widerange of secondary sources.
Stewart mainly concentrates on describing the situation faced
by the soldiers on the ground, and as a result his analysis of the

1 Anthony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (London: Viking, 2009), 266—
269; Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane,
2013 )i 578—579; 1000 ans d'architecture: Un patrimoine exceptionnel, Caen, Tourist
Guide.
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roles played by the Allied naval and air forces is relatively sketchy.
In terms of presenting a more holistic focus of events and their
repercussions, more detail about the mechanism and the fragility of
bringing down naval gunfire on strongpoint defences would have been
useful, particularly as this method of coordinated attack was used
so successfully in helping to overcome a similar strongpoint adjacent
to Hillman. Stewart could also have done more to support his claim
that the air forces did little to assist the inland assault (p.74) by
analysing the reasons, if any, for the breakdown in the procedures
and mechanisms to bring down fire from the Spitfires allocated a
dedicated close air support role to the Sword area (p.141). A fter all,
these Spitfires were scheduled to operate in ‘Patrol Line Charlie’,
almost directly above Hillman.
One of the main reasons the performance of 3 Bri Inf Div was
questioned was because a main objective of the advance to Caen and
beyond on D-Day was to secure sufficient territory to build airfields,
from which the Allied Air Forces could operate their short-range fighters,
outside the range of enemy artillery fire. Stewart noted the relevance of
this topic in his introduction and conclusion but by choosing to side step
the issue in the main body of the book he has missed an opportunity
to contextualise Brigadier Smith’s aversion to risk in the context of
Montgomery’s demand for aggressive tactics and his willingness to
accept almost any risks on D-Day.2 By avoiding the airfield issue Caen
Controversy is perhaps a little too sympathetic to post-event assessments
made by the senior army officers involved, those who coordinated and
produced the official history, and by regimental histories which are in
general supportive of the actions of its officers and men.
The book leaves a few unanswered questions: if Caen was never
really a viable objective for D-Day why were orders to capture Caen
and establish a bridgehead to the south of the River Orne produced
(p.145)? W hy did General Dempsey, who later claimed that he ‘never
expected 3 [Br Inf ] Div to get Caen on the first day’ and who claimed
that ‘if we didn’t get it the first day it would take a month to get it
afterwards’ (p.151), produce orders that required his Second Army
was to secure the airfield sites to the southeast of Caen by D+7-8?3

3 Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe ig4§-ig4{j: Success or Failure? (University
of Michigan: Bnchan & Enright, 1984), 6g.
3 Carlo D ’Este, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery in the
Allied Campaign (London: Collins, 1983), 78.
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Stewart alludes to the possibility of subterfuge surrounding the way
orders were constructed to secure the cooperation of the air and naval
forces (p. x) by citing the work of one of his staff college students, who
claimed that Montgomery and his subordinates always thought Caen
an entirely unrealistic objective.4 If true and taking Caen on D-Day
was always ‘over ambitious’, ‘unachievable’ and ‘too optimistic’ (pp.
146-151.) and the bridgehead secured on D-Day ‘a notable feat of
arms’ another question arises: was why was Smith aversion to risk
punished by relieving him of his command a few days later?
Ultimately, the details provided in the book give the reader sufficient
evidence to delve deeper into these issues. The book provides an extremely
enjoyable and illuminating description of the events and activities of the
3 Br Inf Div which adds a significant degree of granularity to the events
that occurred on Sword Beach and further inland on D-Day. By giving
the reader insight into the various factors that influenced Brigadier
Smith’s thinking, Caen Controversy has opened up areas for further
study and discussion. The overall message conveyed tallies neatly with
other recent work by David French and John Buckley,56 and would be
particularly relevant and useful for academics and graduates studying
the invasion of Normandy, beach assaults and littoral operations as well
as those enthused by the D-Day anniversaries to find out more about
what really happened on that fateful day.
DAVID STUBBS, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

Canada and the End of the Imperial Dream: Beverley Baxter’s
Reports from London through War and Peace, igg6-ig6o. Neville
Thompson. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 393.
Canadians of a certain age will remember Beverley Baxter as the
author of a regular column entitled “Letter from London” that
appeared in Maclean’s back when it was a general interest magazine.

4 James Babbage, “Montgomery’s presentation of his plans for D-Day: a case of
consent and evade?” Defence Studies 11, 4 (2011): 657-671.
6 Drench, David (2003) ‘Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations
for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44’ , Diplomacy & Statecraft, 14: 2, 271-294. John
Buckley,
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